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DETERMINING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
OF NATIONAL BANKS AFTER 
WACHOVIA BANK V. SCHMIDT 
Michael Podolsky* 
 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wachovia Bank v. 
Schmidt, some courts held, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, that national 
banks were citizens of each and every state in which they had a branch.  In 
Schmidt, the Supreme Court made it clear that this approach was incorrect, 
but failed to provide an alternative one.  Not surprisingly, in the wake of 
that decision another court split developed.  While some courts have found 
that national banks are citizens only of the state listed on their charters as 
their main office, others have found that national banks are also citizens of 
the state that is their principal place of business. 
This Note contends that congressional intent and equitable 
considerations mandate that national banks be considered citizens of both 
the state listed on their charter as their main office and the state that is 
their principal place of business.  Also, this Note suggests that Congress 
should amend the relevant statute to clarify that the two-state approach is 
the correct one, and thereby prevent courts from wasting valuable time and 
resources on this issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are many things people consider when choosing a bank with which 
to do business.  Some people choose based upon convenience, others based 
upon stability, and still others based upon customer service.  What most 
people do not consider, however, is where they can sue or be sued by the 
bank if a dispute arises.  Yet this factor, in certain circumstances, may have 
a significant impact on their substantive rights as a litigant. 
For example, according to the Eighth Circuit and many district courts, a 
resident of California who chooses to bank at the local branch of a state-
chartered bank whose principal place of business is California will be able 
to keep her suit in California state court.1  Yet, if the same California 
resident instead chooses to bank at a branch of a nationally chartered 
bank—for example, Wells Fargo—she may be forced to litigate her case in 
the federal court system.  This is true despite the fact that Wells Fargo’s 
principal place of business is California.2 
The reason for the different outcomes stems from the fact that courts use 
two different tests to determine the citizenship of each bank for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes.  In a footnote to Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt,3 the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to decide whether national banks, for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, are considered citizens of both their principal place of 
business and the state listed in their charter as their main office.4  The Court 
stated that the question “may be of scant practical significance for, in 
almost every case . . . the location of a national bank’s main office and of its 
principal place of business coincide.”5  However, the cases since Schmidt 
suggest otherwise, as the principal places of business of the country’s 
largest nationally chartered banks are in different states than their main 
offices.6 
Part I of this Note explores the history of national banks and their access 
to the federal court system.  Part II discusses the circuit split the Supreme 
Court resolved in Schmidt, which ultimately led to a new circuit split.  Part 
III presents the current split over whether a national bank should be 
considered a citizen of the state that is its principal place of business in 
addition to the state its charter designates as its main office.  Part IV 
 
 1. See infra Part III.A. 
 2. The same is true of New York residents with respect to Chase Manhattan Bank.  
Under the Eighth Circuit’s rationale, Chase Bank would be able to remove a case brought by 
a New York resident to federal court even though Chase’s principal place of business is New 
York. 
 3. 546 U.S. 303 (2006). 
 4. Id. at 317 n.9. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
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contends that a dual-test approach most closely comports with the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Schmidt, best captures Congress’s intent to achieve 
jurisdictional parity, and is the most equitable result.  Part IV also suggests 
that Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 1348 with language similar to that 
found in the diversity statute for corporations, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, in order to 
unequivocally clarify any uncertainties. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL BANKS AND THEIR ACCESS 
TO FEDERAL COURT 
Part I outlines the history of national banks and describes the current 
landscape of national banks’ access to federal court. National banks have 
seen their access to federal court expanded and reduced throughout history.7  
While they once were given unlimited access to federal court by virtue of 
their existence as federally chartered institutions, they now must rely on 
diversity jurisdiction if they wish to get into federal court.8 
A.  Diversity 101:  The Power of a Federal Court To Hear a Case 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such are 
empowered to hear only those cases which the Constitution allows 
Congress to authorize and which Congress does in fact authorize.9  Both of 
these conditions must be satisfied for a case to be heard in federal court.10  
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a given case and 
cannot be waived, cannot be consented to, and can be argued even on 
appeal.11  The parties cannot be in federal court, even by consent, unless 
allowed by the Constitution or Congress.12  Furthermore, even if parties 
themselves do not raise subject matter jurisdiction concerns, a court itself, 
either at the trial or appellate level, is obligated to raise the issue on its own 
if need be.13 
The two primary sources of federal subject matter jurisdiction are federal 
question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.14  Federal question 
jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises under federal law as 
 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See infra Part I.C. 
 9. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1187–88 (2010); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3522 
(2d ed. 1984). 
 10. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3522. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428, 431 (2004) (“Compliance with the 
provisions of § 1257 is an essential prerequisite to our deciding the merits of a case brought 
here under that section.  It is our obligation to raise any question of such compliance on our 
own motion, even though counsel has not called our attention to it.”); 13 WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 9, § 3522. 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2006). 
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determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule.15  Diversity jurisdiction 
establishes a neutral forum to protect out-of-state litigants from the 
prejudices of state courts.16  The intention behind diversity jurisdiction is to 
reduce the friction between citizens of different states by giving them a 
neutral forum to resolve their disputes.17 
Congress granted diversity jurisdiction to federal courts in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332.  The statute provides that for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the 
amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 and the dispute must be 
between citizens of different states.18  When a litigant is a corporation the 
statute makes the corporation a citizen of two places:  the state in which it is 
incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business.19  
Though state banks are incorporated in their state, just like any other 
corporation, national banks are not; rather, they are federally chartered 
institutions.20  Therefore, citizenship of national banks for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes is not determined by § 1332(c), but rather is 
determined by a different statute, codified as § 1348.21 
B.  What Is a National Bank Anyway? 
The first modern version of a national bank was created in 1863 during 
the Civil War.22  Congress adopted Treasury Secretary Samuel P. Chase’s 
proposal to create “a national banking system under which commercial 
banks chartered by the federal government would be authorized to issue 
federal bank notes secured by government bonds.”23  Although national 
banks are no longer responsible for issuing U.S. currency, the “federal-state 
dual banking system . . . [is] a central feature of commercial banking in the 
 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  For a discussion on the well-pleaded complaint rule, see 
Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading:  A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1781 
(1998). 
 16. See Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883) (“[T]he very object of giving to the 
national courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the States in controversies between 
citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals which it might be supposed 
would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views.”). 
 17. Id.  There is much academic commentary devoted to the question of whether 
diversity jurisdiction remains justifiable in modern society; however, this discussion is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  For a discussion on the continued necessity of federal 
diversity jurisdiction, see David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction:  A Survey and a 
Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1977). 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 
(N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
 20. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3627. 
 21. See infra Part I.C. 
 22. See Paul E. Lund, National Banks and Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 73, 76 (2007) (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, amended by Act of 
June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of 
Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681 (1988).  Though the 
government first tried to finance the war without a national banking system, politicians soon 
realized that they needed one. See Lund, supra, at 77. 
 23. Lund, supra note 22, at 77. 
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United States to this day.”24  When a national bank is created, its 
organization certificate must designate “[t]he place where its operations of 
discount and deposit are to be carried on.”25 
Initially, national banks were not allowed to operate branch offices.26  
Later, when the authority to operate branches was given, it was generally 
limited only to branches in the bank’s home state.27  By the second half of 
the twentieth century, state-chartered branch banking had expanded all over 
the country, raising concerns over the continued competitiveness of 
nationally chartered banks.28  To correct the inequality between state and 
federally chartered banks, Congress authorized national banks to open or 
acquire branch offices outside their home states.29 
C.  Easy Come, Easy Go:  National Banks’ Access to Federal Court 
In 1824, the Supreme Court concluded that because the Bank of the 
United States, a precursor to the modern national banking system, had been 
created by an act of Congress, any suit to which a national bank was a party 
necessarily involved a federal question, and thus automatically qualified for 
federal jurisdiction, irrespective of diversity.30  Implementation of this 
decision, however, added many cases to the federal workload, and Congress 
subsequently withdrew automatic jurisdiction in 1882.31  In its place, 
Congress provided that “the jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or 
against any association established under [federal] law . . . shall be the same 
as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not 
organized under any law of the United States.”32  In essence, national banks 
were now subject to the same diversity jurisdiction requirements as state 
banks. 
In 1887, Congress revised the statute to say that “for the purposes of all 
actions by or against [national banks], [they should] be deemed citizens of 
the States in which they are respectively located.”33  This language 
remained unchanged when Congress adopted the Judicial Code of 1911.34  
 
 24. Id. at 77.  Authority to charter national banks is within the power of the Comptroller 
of Currency. See id. at 78. 
 25. 12 U.S.C. § 22 (2006). 
 26. Butler & Macey, supra note 22, at 702 (“Under the National Bank Act of 1864, 
national banks could operate out of only one central office in the state in which the bank was 
located.”); Lund, supra note 22, at 79. 
 27. See Lund, supra note 22, at 79. 
 28. See id. at 79–80. 
 29. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339–43. 
 30. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 759–60 (1824); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 9, § 3571. 
 31. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3571. 
 32. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163. 
 33. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 Stat. 552, 554–55 (“[C]ircuit and district courts 
shall not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between individual 
citizens of the same State.”). 
 34. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091–94.  Congress gave 
federal courts jurisdiction in cases brought by the United States (or by direction of any 
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Moreover, this same language still remains in the current statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1348, which now reads: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, 
against any national banking association, [or] any civil action to wind up 
the affairs of any such association . . . .  All national banking associations 
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed 
citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.35 
Thus, for actions brought by the United States or any of its officers, or to 
close a national bank, district courts were given original jurisdiction.  
However, for all other actions, national banks would be subject to normal 
diversity jurisdiction requirements with their citizenship determined by the 
“[s]tates in which they are respectively located.”36 
This inability of national banks to automatically access federal court was 
confirmed and expanded by the Supreme Court in Leather Manufacturers’ 
Bank v. Cooper.37  The Court found that the 1882 Act repealed automatic 
jurisdiction and implied that national banks could also not automatically 
remove cases to federal court simply because they are federally chartered 
institutions.38  As the Court emphasized, “[a] national bank was by that 
statute placed before the law in this respect the same as a bank not 
organized under the laws of the United States.”39 
Soon after Cooper, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1887 statute in 
Petri v. Commercial National Bank of Chicago.40  The Court was forced to 
decide whether national banks could ever sue or be sued in federal court on 
diversity jurisdiction grounds.41  The Court explained that there is no reason 
that “Congress intended that national banks should not resort to Federal 
tribunals as other corporations and individual citizens might.”42  Therefore, 
the Court held that national banks, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, are 
on the same footing as citizens or corporations.43 
 
officer thereof) and cases that involved the winding up of any bank.  However, Congress 
reiterated that, for purposes of any other actions, national banks should still be deemed 
citizens of the States in which they are located. See Lund, supra note 22, at 82 n.48. 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 120 U.S. 778 (1887). 
 38. Id. at 781; see also Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317, 332–33 (2009) (“[The 1882 Act] was intended to 
place national banks ‘on the same footing’ as state-chartered banks.” (quoting Cooper, 120 
U.S. at 780)). 
 39. Cooper, 120 U.S. at 781. 
 40. 142 U.S. 644 (1892). 
 41. Id. at 649–50. 
 42. Id. at 651. 
 43. Id.; see Bradley J. Johnson & George Brandon, National Banks and Diversity 
Jurisdiction Revisited:  More Authority For Remaining in Federal Court, 122 BANKING L.J. 
879, 894 (2005) (“In Petri the Court specifically held that the lower courts should exercise 
diversity jurisdiction over national banks in the same way they exercise diversity jurisdiction 
over other corporations.”). 
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D.  Why the Option to Access Federal Court Matters 
Prior the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,44 
the option to have a case heard in federal court allowed a party to choose 
whether it wanted to be subject to state common law or federal common 
law; however, Erie put an end to “law shopping.”45  Though some lawyers 
still believe in the benefits of “law shopping,” the more common belief is 
that it is rarely, if ever, the reason why a party would choose to litigate in 
federal court.46  Additionally, while varying procedural differences once 
drove court selection, such differences have dramatically narrowed in recent 
years.47 
With substantive and procedural considerations no longer largely 
significant, the main reasons for choosing one court system over another 
come down to the comfort of the lawyer in a particular system, the relative 
speed of the docket, convenience of the court’s location (to the party or the 
lawyer), jury pool selection, and the perception of judges in each system.48 
Interestingly, plaintiffs’ counsel once preferred federal court over state 
court as they perceived federal judges to be of higher quality and less tied to 
large businesses and establishments than state judges.49  However, this 
preference has been reversed now as the perception of judges has 
changed.50 Federal judges are no longer seen as friends of plaintiffs, and 
state judges are often seen by defense counsel as unsympathetic, if not 
outright antagonistic, to some defendants.51 
Regardless of whether state or federal court is preferable to any particular 
party in any given case, it is clear that having the option is always an 
advantage.52  According to an empirical study, removal has a serious 
 
 44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 45. Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court:  A Better Way To 
Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1528 (2005). 
 46. See id. at 1528.  Statistical analysis suggests that “law shopping” has very little 
effect on the outcome of the case. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case 
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal 
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 600 (1998) (“[F]orum-shopping for more favorable 
law is not a major factor in producing the removal effect.”). 
 47. See Morrison, supra note 45, at 1528. 
 48. See id. at 1528–29. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. at 1529; Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1775 (2008) (“Plaintiff attorneys’ preference for state courts is 
undisputed and understandable.  Reasons for avoiding federal court range from the mundane 
(greater familiarity with state procedure) to the strategic (greater likelihood of securing 
justice for clients).”). 
 51. See Morrison, supra note 45, at 1529–30. 
 52. See Lyle Washowich, National Banks Beware:  Your Branches May Carry Greater 
Risk Than You Realize, 122 BANKING L.J. 699, 700 (2005) (“In litigation of state law claims, 
the strategic option of removing an action to federal court serves as a weapon to diluting 
those claims.”). 
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negative effect on plaintiffs’ win rate.53  The study states that “data on 
removal jurisdiction leads to the conclusion that forum really does affect 
outcome, with removal taking the defendant to a forum much more 
favorable in terms of biases and inconveniences.”54  Since forum has been 
shown to significantly affect the outcome of the case, forum-access 
provisions are of the utmost importance.55 
II.  WACHOVIA BANK V. SCHMIDT:  RESOLVING ONE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
WHILE CREATING ANOTHER 
Until the Supreme Court decided Schmidt in 2006, courts of appeals were 
split on how to interpret the term “located” in § 1348 for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes.56  The clarity the Court offered in Schmidt on this 
issue proved to be short lived, however, as the case opened the door for 
further confusion regarding federal jurisdiction over national banks. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Earlier Decision on Venue 
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Citizens & Southern National Bank 
v. Bougas,57 in which the Court was forced to interpret the word “located” 
in a previous version of 12 U.S.C. § 94 relating to venue.58  The statute read 
in part, “[A]ctions and proceedings against any association under this 
chapter may be had . . . [in the court] in which such association may be 
established, or [in the court] in which said association is located having 
jurisdiction in similar cases.”59  The Court concluded that, for venue 
purposes, the words “established” and “located” were different:  
“established” referred to the place listed on the bank’s charter as its main 
office, and “located” referred to all districts in which the bank operates a 
branch.60 
The Supreme Court, however, did not rule on whether the term “located” 
in the diversity jurisdiction statute should be interpreted the same way as 
the venue statute.  After Bougas, various district courts weighed in on the 
issue.  Some courts held that a national bank was “located” in every state in 
which it operated a branch and was, thus, a citizen of every such state, while 
 
 53. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 606–07 (noting that a plaintiff’s odds are 
even without removal and 39 percent with removal).  It should be noted, however, that some 
of this drop can be attributed to case selection. Id. 
 54. Id. at 607. 
 55. Id. at 607 n.81. 
 56. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 309 (2006) (“We granted certiorari to 
resolve the disagreement among Courts of Appeals on the meaning of § 1348.”). 
 57. 434 U.S. 35 (1977). 
 58. Id. at 37. 
 59. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).  This statute was later amended to overrule Bougas.  It now 
reads:  “Any action or proceeding against a national banking association [dealing with the 
FDIC] . . . shall be brought in the district or territorial court of the United States held within 
the district in which that association’s principal place of business is located . . . .” Id. 
 60. Bougas, 434 U.S. at 44; Lund, supra note 22, at 84. 
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other courts interpreted “located” to refer only to a bank’s principal place of 
business.61  Eventually, federal circuit courts began to decide the issue. 
B.  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits:  “Located” Limited to Only Two 
Places—The State of the Bank’s Main Office and the State of Its 
Principal Place of Business 
The first circuit court to address the issue was the Seventh Circuit in 
Firstar Bank v. Faul,62 where it determined that the term “located” did not 
refer to all places where the bank had a branch but rather, referred to only 
two locations:  the state listed on the bank’s charter and the state where the 
bank has its principal place of business.63  Firstar, a national bank, sued an 
individual, Faul, and his corporation in the Eastern District of Illinois.64  
Firstar invoked diversity jurisdiction since Faul and his corporation were 
both citizens of Illinois, whereas Firstar was a citizen of Ohio, its principal 
place of business.65  Faul argued that diversity jurisdiction was lacking 
because Firstar operated over forty-five branches in Illinois and, therefore, 
should be considered a citizen of Illinois as well.66 
The court needed to interpret § 1348 to determine where Firstar was 
“located” to see if diversity existed.  First, the court tried to determine 
whether the statutory language of § 1348 provided a clear answer to the 
meaning of “located.”67  Because the term is not defined in the statute, the 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress must have intended it to have its 
ordinary meaning.68  But the ordinary meaning, as determined from various 
dictionary definitions, provided no guidance.69  Furthermore, the court 
relied on the Supreme Court’s statement in Bougas that “located” has “no 
enduring rigidity.”70  Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded, “the word has 
no plain meaning as between a single place or multiple areas.”71 
 
 61. Compare Fin. Software Sys., Inc. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 84 F. Supp. 2d 594 
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that a national bank with its principal place of business in North 
Carolina and branches in Pennsylvania was not a citizen of Pennsylvania for diversity 
purposes), with Nw. Bank Minn. v. Patton, 924 F. Supp. 114 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding that a 
national bank is a citizen, for diversity purposes, of every state in which it maintains 
substantial presence, including branches), and Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Iacono, 785 F. Supp. 30 
(D.R.I. 1992) (holding that a national bank with branch offices in Rhode Island is a citizen of 
Rhode Island for diversity purposes). 
 62. 253 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 63. Id. at 994. 
 64. Id. at 985. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 987.  Courts will often begin their statutory analysis by seeing if the statutory 
language itself can provide a clear answer to the meaning of the words in question. See 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999). 
 68. Faul, 253 F.3d at 987 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)). 
 69. Id. (“[S]uch definitions do not provide much aid in our inquiry.”). 
 70. Id. (quoting Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. 
 2012] DETERMINING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 1457 
The court next considered whether “located” had acquired a specified 
meaning in the context of diversity jurisdiction.72  The court found that 
indeed it had, and that it was a more restrictive meaning than the word 
would ordinarily connote.73  To support this conclusion, the court looked at 
the treatment of corporations under the diversity statute and determined that 
the “use of the word ‘located’ in discussing a corporation likely refers to the 
state where the principal place of business is located or perhaps where the 
company is incorporated.”74  The court justified this position by saying that 
if, in the course of discussing jurisdictional motions, a federal judge were to 
ask a lawyer representing a corporation, “[W]here is your client located?” 
the judge would likely expect to hear the lawyer respond by naming the 
state containing the principal place of business and probably the state of 
incorporation as well.  The judge would not expect the lawyer to “rattle off” 
every state in which the corporation has a physical presence.75  While the 
court conceded that, in the context of partnerships, “located” would refer to 
a large number of places, it found that national banks are more similar to 
corporations for this purpose.76 
To bolster its argument, the court then looked to established Supreme 
Court precedent for the proposition that statutory words can achieve settled 
meaning over time through judicial interpretation.77  Section 1348 was 
derived from previous statutes that had already been interpreted, and if 
Congress failed to alter the words, courts must presume that the new statute 
has the same meaning as the older version.78  The 1882 Act and the 1887 
Act contained the words “in which they are respectively located,” which 
remain in the statute to this day.79  Cooper and Petri interpreted these two 
statutes respectively and concluded that the purpose of the words was to put 
national banks in the same position as state banks.80 
The Faul court did not find the Bougas court’s conclusion that “located” 
refers to all locations where a bank has a branch applicable, because Bougas 
carefully limited its holding to the venue statute’s application to determine 
state court venue, pointing out that the question of federal court venue was 
not before it.81  Moreover, the Bougas court emphasized that its holding on 
 
 72. Id. (“Another interpretive method that focuses on the statutory language is to 
consider the subject matter to which a word or phrase refers.” (citing U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. 
v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 455 (1993))). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  For an argument that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in this context is circular, 
see Lund, supra note 22, at 88. 
 76. Id. at 987. 
 77. Id. at 988 (“If a phrase or section of a law is clarified through judicial construction, 
and the law is amended but retains that same phrase or section, then Congress presumably 
intended for the language in the new law to have the same meaning as the old.” (citing 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998))). 
 78. Id. (citing Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991); NBD Bank v. 
Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 988. 
 81. Id. at 989. 
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venue would not impose significant costs or inconvenience on the bank.82  
While this justification is relevant in the venue context—since the primary 
purpose of venue statutes is to limit inconvenience to the parties—it does 
not apply in determining subject matter jurisdiction.83  Subject matter 
jurisdiction instead is about the power of federal courts to hear certain types 
of cases.84  As the Faul court explained, “[R]eductions in the cost of 
litigating do not justify separating national banks from all other 
corporations so as to deny them federal diversity jurisdiction.”85 
The Seventh Circuit then assessed the defendant’s argument that the 
words “established” and “located” must have two separate meanings based 
on the canon of statuary interpretation to that effect.86  Without interpreting 
the meaning of “established” (since the issue was not before the court), the 
court suggested that the canon could be satisfied without “location” 
referring to all places in which a bank has a branch.87  While “established” 
could refer only to the location listed on the bank’s charter, “located” could 
refer to both the location on the charter and the principal place of 
business.88 
The Seventh Circuit further dismissed Faul’s other argument that by 
amending the venue statute to include “principal place of business,” but not 
amending the diversity statute, Congress evinced its intention for courts to 
apply Bougas’s definition of “located” in the diversity context.89  The court 
reasoned that since the statutes at hand are from different acts and different 
sections of the code, Faul’s argument was unpersuasive.90  Additionally, it 
was just as plausible to conclude that by changing 12 U.S.C. § 94 to limit 
the number of locations where venue would be appropriate, Congress 
showed that it disagreed with Bougas’s conclusion and did not intend 
“located” to refer to any branch locations in any context, including the 
diversity jurisdiction context.91 
The final argument the court rejected was that national banks with local 
state branches would suffer from bias in those state courts because they do 
in fact have local ties.92  Therefore, the argument went, they should not be 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 989–90 (“This rationale supports an expansive view of venue since the primary 
purpose of venue statutes is to limit inconvenience to the parties.”). 
 84. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 85. Faul, 253 F.3d at 990. 
 86. Id. at 991. 
 87. Id. at 992. 
 88. Id. (“Thus, the canon that different words in the same statute should be given 
different meanings can be complied with by considering ‘established’ as referring only to the 
place specified in the bank’s charter, while giving ‘located’ a meaning that includes a bank’s 
principal place of business.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 992–93 (“[O]ne could just as easily read [from Congress’s actions] that it 
disagreed with Bougas and did not desire for ‘located’ to refer to any place where a branch is 
found.”). 
 92. Id. at 993. 
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allowed to resort to federal court since the purpose of diversity jurisdiction 
is to provide a fair venue for out-of-state litigants to be heard without fear 
of local biases and prejudices.93  However, the court rejected this argument 
by comparing national banks to corporations.94  Despite the fact that a 
corporation can have many locations, Congress explicitly decided that 
corporations could still maintain diversity jurisdiction in states where they 
conduct business and have substantial ties (other than their state of 
incorporation and their principal place of business), regardless of whether 
or not there might not be any bias.95  Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Faul held 
that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1348, a national bank is “‘located’ in, and 
thus a citizen of, the state of its principal place of business and the state 
listed in its organizational certificate” and not in every state where it 
operates a branch.96 
The Fifth Circuit in Horton v. Bank One97 reached the same conclusion 
as the Seventh Circuit, holding that a national bank is not located (for 
purposes of the statute) in each and every state in which it has a branch.98  
Horton, a Texas citizen, filed suit against Bank One, a nationally chartered 
bank, in Texas state court asserting common law claims and statutory 
consumer protection claims.99  After Bank One removed the case to federal 
court, Horton attempted to remand, claiming that Bank One had branches in 
Texas and thus was “located” in Texas.100  Because Horton was a Texas 
citizen, he argued that diversity was lacking and thus the federal court had 
no jurisdiction to hear his case.101 
The Fifth Circuit decided that Bank One was not a citizen of Texas and 
allowed the suit to proceed.102  In doing so, the court explicitly followed 
and adopted all of Faul’s rationales.103  Particularly, it emphasized the need 
for establishing jurisdictional parity between state banks and national 
banks.104  The court explained, “[W]e should read section 1348 as retaining 
its objective of jurisdictional parity for national banks vis-à-vis state banks 
and corporations.”105  The Fifth Circuit in Horton, therefore, could not 
conclude that a national bank is located in every state in which it has a 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 994. 
 97. 387 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Id. at 436. 
 99. Id. at 428. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 436. 
 103. Id. at 429 (“We follow [Faul]’s holding that a national bank is not ‘located’ in, and 
thus not a citizen of, every state in which it has a branch.”). 
 104. Id. at 431 (“Since a state bank, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), may be a citizen of no 
more than two states—the state where its principal place of business is located and its state 
of incorporation—maintaining jurisdictional parity between a national and state bank 
requires that the national bank have no more than two possible states of citizenship.”). 
 105. Id. 
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branch, as that “would restrict a national bank’s access to federal court . . . 
without similarly restricting a state bank.”106 
C.  The Second and Fourth Circuits:  “Located” Refers to Any State in 
Which a National Bank Operates a Branch 
The Second Circuit, in World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C. v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,107 in contrast to the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, found that a national bank should be “deemed to be a citizen of 
every state in which it has offices.”108  It did not, however, expand on this 
conclusion, and it is now considered dicta.109  The Fourth Circuit, in 
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt,110 took the same position as the Second Circuit, 
yet it went into great detail to explain its decision.  In the case, Schmidt and 
others filed a complaint in South Carolina state court claiming that 
Wachovia fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to engage in a risky tax-
motivated investment scheme.111  In response, Wachovia filed a petition in 
federal court seeking to compel arbitration of the state claims.112  The court 
was forced to decide whether Wachovia was “located” in South Carolina 
for diversity purposes merely by operating a branch there.113  If so, then 
Wachovia was not able to sue in federal court, as Schmidt was a South 
Carolina citizen and diversity jurisdiction would thus be lacking.114 
The Fourth Circuit first rooted its approach in the canon of statutory 
construction that the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute should 
govern, barring exceptional circumstance.115  The court found that the term 
“located” as it appears in § 1348 is unambiguous and referred to each and 
every place in which the bank maintains a branch.116  The court quoted 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as defining “locate” to mean, 
“to set or establish in a particular spot or position.”117  It also quoted 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defined location as “[t]he specific place or 
position of a person or thing.”118  The court stated that, not only is “located” 
unambiguous today, it was also unambiguous in 1948 when § 1348 was 
 
 106. Id. at 432. 
 107. 345 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 108. Id. at 161. 
 109. See Lund, supra note 22, at 93 (“[T]he court provided no supporting rationale for 
this assertion, and the statement appeared as dicta.”). 
 110. 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). 
 111. Id. at 416. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 416. 
 116. Id. at 418 (“In light of these definitions, the dissent’s conclusion that the word 
‘located’ is ambiguous is puzzling.”). 
 117. Id. at 416–17 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1327 
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Id. at 417 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (8th ed. 2004)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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enacted, and in 1887 when first put into the statute.119  Moreover, the sixth 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary—the only source to consider the verb 
“located” separately from location—defined “located” as a legal term:  
“having physical presence or existence in a place.”120  Thus, the court did 
not find “located” to be ambiguous; rather, it unambiguously means every 
place where a bank has a physical presence. 
The Fourth Circuit also applied the statutory interpretation canon that 
different terms in the same statute should be given different meanings.121  
Section 1348 uses two different terms when referring to the presence of a 
banking association:  “established” and “located.”122  The first part of the 
statute, which states that “any action by a banking association established in 
the district for which the court is held,” refers to automatic federal 
jurisdiction for actions by the government, while the second part, which 
states that national banks shall be “deemed citizens of the States in which 
they are respectively located,”123 refers to all other actions.  The Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the word “established” refers to the bank’s 
establishment, which is the place listed on its certificate of incorporation, 
while “located” refers to any place in which a bank may have a branch.124  
In fact, the Supreme Court in Bougas, when faced with a similar scenario, 
gave “established” and “located” two distinct meanings.125  Interestingly, 
subsequent to the decision in Bougas, Congress amended the venue statute, 
removing the word “located” and inserting “principal place of business.”126  
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if Congress intended to exclude branches 
in the diversity statute, it would have amended § 1348 in the same way that 
it amended the venue statute.127 
The Fourth Circuit then relied on the canon of statutory interpretation 
known as in pari materia.128  According to this canon, statutes that relate to 
the same subject matter should be interpreted in light of and consistently 
with one another.129  Since the jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. § 1348) and 
the venue statute (12 U.S.C. § 94) related to the same subject matter (the 
 
 119. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1089 (4th ed. 1968); OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 1081 (2d ed. 1989) (providing examples from 1807 to 1896)). 
 120. See id. (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 940 (6th ed. 1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 121. Id. at 418. 
 122. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000). 
 124. Schmidt, 388 F.3d. at 419. 
 125. Id. at 420 (“The principle that different terms conjunctively used in the same statute 
should be given different meanings is identically applicable here.  Indeed, section 1348 
includes the very same words . . . used in similarly close proximity and in a highly similar 
context . . . .  As in Bougas, the two words must be given their distinct meanings.”). 
 126. See 12 U.S.C. § 94 (2006). 
 127. Schmidt, 388 F.3d. at 421 (“In sum, if Congress wishes to specify principal place of 
business and thereby exclude branch locations, it can easily do so.  And in fact it has done so 
elsewhere.”). 
 128. Id. at 422. 
 129. Id. (citing United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940)). 
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ability to sue national banks), this canon applied.130  As § 1348 adopted the 
same words, which were already defined by Bougas, in pari materia 
directed the court to adopt the same meaning of the term “located” for the 
diversity jurisdiction statute as has been adopted for the venue statue.131  
Because the Supreme Court in Bougas interpreted “located” in the venue 
statute to refer to all places where the bank had a branch, so too, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned, “located” in the diversity jurisdiction statute must be 
interpreted the same way.132 
Following its in-depth statutory interpretation analysis, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected the argument that “located” in § 1348 has a “settled background 
understanding” and must therefore be interpreted in that light, as the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits suggested.133  The court found that no “consistent 
statutory usage, no settled meaning in the case law, and no historical 
statutory purpose addressed the question whether ‘located’ includes branch 
offices.”134  Rather, the court believed that the issue “had never been 
‘clarified by judicial construction’ and had never reached any ‘established 
understanding’ at the time of section 1348’s enactment.”135  Only one court 
had considered the meaning of “located” under the 1887 Act (the precursor 
to § 1348), holding that “located” refers to the principal place of 
business.136  However, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that one case was not 
enough to establish a “settled background meaning” of “located” upon 
which Congress necessarily relied.137  In sum, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that there was no settled background understanding of “located” prior to 
Congress’s enactment of § 1348.138 
After its statutory analysis, the Fourth Circuit then analyzed the historical 
purpose of § 1348.139  Wachovia argued that the Act of 1882 and the Act of 
1887 established a background understanding which was apparently 
 
 130. Id. (“Because the jurisdiction and venue statutes pertain to the same subject matter, 
namely the amenability of [national banks] to suit in federal court . . . the two statutes should 
be interpreted as using the same vocabulary consistently to discuss this same subject 
matter.”). 
 131. Id. (“Here, section 1348 adopted the same vocabulary . . . [and s]ince the Supreme 
Court in Bougas provided the definitive construction of those terms in the venue statute, [the 
canon] directs us to adopt the same construction for the jurisdiction statute.”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 425. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. (quoting Faul, 253 F.3d at 988).  The court proceeded to list various statutes 
in which “located” had been interpreted to mean the charter location and others where it 
means all the branch locations. Id. 
 136. Id. at 426 (citing Am. Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.3d 160, 161–62 (9th Cir. 
1943)). 
 137. Id.  The court then stressed that the other cases on which Wachovia relied in order to 
suggest that “located” has a settled background meaning all predated the McFadden Act (the 
Act which allowed branch offices) and thus the “charter location was the only candidate for 
‘location.’” Id. 
 138. Id.  In fact, interstate branch offices did not exist prior to 1933 and the issue was 
“very seldom raised, much less settled” between 1933 and when § 1348 was enacted in its 
current form. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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readopted in § 1348, namely Congress’s intent “to give national banks the 
same access to diversity jurisdiction as that enjoyed by state corporations 
and individual citizens generally.”140  However, the Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that the historical intent was not so clear.  The Act of 1882 reads, in 
pertinent part, “[J]urisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against [a 
national bank] . . . shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction 
for suits by or against banks not organized under [federal charter].”141  The 
Cooper court, in 1887, held that the purpose of the Act was “to put national 
banks on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located 
for . . . jurisdiction.”142 
Subsequently, in 1887, the Act was changed to read that national banks  
shall, for the purposes of all actions by or against them . . . be deemed 
citizens of the States in which they are respectively located; and in such 
cases [there shall be no jurisdiction] other than such as they would have in 
cases between individual citizens of the same State.143   
The Court in Petri, interpreting the 1887 Act, held that the Act established 
parity between national banks and “other corporations and individual 
citizens.”144 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that history shows that there are three 
possible parties that Congress believed national banks should be in parity 
with:  individual citizens, state banks, other corporations, or all three.145  
Since there are “several different formulations of that parity principle [and] 
no guidance on how to select among them,” the court reasoned that there is 
no obvious background principle under which Congress was legislating.146 
The Fourth Circuit also found the historical purpose argument to be 
weak.147  It emphasized that the courts in Petri and Cooper rested on the 
actual text of the Act as it stood at the time, which explicitly made reference 
to jurisdictional parity between national and state banks.148  However, that 
language was replaced by § 1348, which contains no reference to state 
banks, corporations, or individual citizens.149 Furthermore, the parity 
principle that is claimed to be established by the 1882 and 1887 Acts would 
“be inapplicable or, at best, neutral as to the issue” since there were no bank 
branches prior to 1933.150 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, 22 Stat. 163. 
 142. Leather Mfrs. Nat’l Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887). 
 143. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 554–55. 
 144. Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 427 (emphasis added) (quoting Petri v. Commercial Nat’l Bank 
of Chi., 142 U.S. 644, 651 (1892)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 428 (“But even if we thought the statute was ambiguous enough to warrant 
consulting such abstract, judicially intuited purposes, and even if the abstract purpose urged 
upon us were sufficiently definite to provide clear guidance, we would reject [the historical 
argument] for at least three reasons.”). 
 148. See id. at 428. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. (emphasis omitted). 
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Rather, the parity principle that Congress incorporated is the principle 
that national banks are subject to diversity jurisdiction just like state banks, 
corporations, and individuals, as opposed to automatic federal question 
jurisdiction, to which national banks were previously entitled.151  The 
Fourth Circuit found it telling that Congress did not adopt language in 
§ 1348 similar to the language that it adopted in § 1332(c).152  If Congress 
truly intended for national banks to be treated like state banks and 
corporations, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, it would have changed the 
language in § 1348 to limit jurisdiction to the state of incorporation and 
principal place just as it did in § 1332(c).153 
Based on the plain meaning of the statute, canons of interpretation, and 
the absence of any contrary background meaning, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that national banks, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, must be 
considered citizens of each state in which they operate a branch.154 
D.  The Supreme Court Sides With the Fifth and Seventh Circuits:  
“Located” Does Not Mean Each and Every State Where There Is a Branch; 
But What Does It Mean? 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Schmidt, and reversed the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding.155 The Supreme Court analyzed the Fourth Circuit’s three 
principle reasons for deciding that “located” refers to each state in which a 
bank has a branch, and proceeded to reject each one.156 
First, the Court did not believe that the term “located” had a fixed and 
plain meaning.157  In fact, the Court cited its earlier decision in Bougas for 
the proposition that “[t]here is no enduring rigidity about the word 
‘located.’”158  The Court added that, in some places in the National Banking 
Act, “located” refers to a single location, while in others, it includes bank 
branches.159 
 
 151. See id. at 429 (“In other words, even if the parity principle(s) ascribed by the 
Supreme Court to Congress in the 1882 Act and the 1887 Act were somehow incorporated 
into the 1948 statute, any such principle would only guarantee that national banks are 
subject to the rules of diversity jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 152. See id. at 431. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. at 432 (“The word ‘located’ in 28 U.S.C. § 1348 must be interpreted in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning . . . [a]nd no contrary background meaning is available 
counseling against this interpretation.  Therefore [the court held] that a national banking 
association is ‘located’ under section 1348 in any state where it operates branch offices.”). 
 155. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006). 
 156. See id. at 312–13. 
 157. See id. at 313 (citing various statutes which use the word “location,” some of which 
refer to the charter location and some which refer to all branch locations). 
 158. Id. at 314 (quoting Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977)). 
 159. Id. at 314 n.7. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 52 (2006) (stating that a national bank’s stock 
must state “the name and location of the association”), and 12 U.S.C. § 55 (2006) (requiring 
notice of the sale of stock “in a newspaper of the city or town in which the bank is located”), 
and 12 U.S.C. § 75 (2006) (requiring a bank to reschedule its annual shareholder meeting 
when it “falls on a legal holiday in the State in which the bank is located”), with 12 U.S.C. 
§ 85 (2006) (limiting allowable interest rate to the “rate allowed by the laws of the State, 
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Second, the Court discussed the Fourth Circuit’s attempt to give the 
words “established” and “located” different meanings.160  The Fourth 
Circuit held that “established” refers to a bank’s main office and “located” 
to each place where the bank has a branch.161  However, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the words “established” and “located” may in fact have been 
meant as synonyms.162  When Congress enacted § 1348’s statutory 
predecessors and § 1348 itself, a national bank generally could not operate 
branches outside its home state.163  Therefore, it could not be that Congress 
intended for the two words to have different meanings.164  Rather, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress’s use of the two terms was merely 
a coincidence of statutory consolidation—the two parts coming from two 
different provisions, which were combined in the 1911 revision of the 
Judicial Code.165  As the Court put it, “‘located’ . . . is a chameleon word; 
its meaning depends on the context in and purpose for which it is used.”166 
Third, the Court addressed the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning that under the 
canon of in pari materia the venue statute and the jurisdiction statutes 
should be interpreted consistently.167  The Court held that Bougas does not 
control the meaning of “located” in § 1348.168  While acknowledging that it 
is true that statutes addressing the same subject matter should be read in 
pari materia, the Court explained, “[V]enue and subject-matter jurisdiction 
are not concepts of the same order.”169  Rather, venue is a matter of 
convenience and can be waived, while subject matter jurisdiction concerns 
a court’s competence to adjudicate a particular category of cases.170  
Because venue is about convenience, the Bougas Court held that 
interpreting the venue statute to include all branch locations would not 
inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it.171  Subject matter jurisdiction, 
on the other hand, does not depend on convenience, but rather is based upon 
whether “the Legislature [has] empowered the court to hear cases of a 
 
Territory, or District where the bank is located”), and 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2006) (permitting a 
bank to act as an insurance agent when the bank is “located and doing business in any place 
the population of which does not exceed five thousand”). 
 160. Schmidt, 546 U.S. at 314. 
 161. Id. at 312–13. 
 162. See id. at 314. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id.  In fact the codifying “Act explicitly stated that ‘so far as [its provisions were] 
substantially the same as existing statutes,’ they should ‘be construed as continuations 
thereof, and not as new enactments.’” Id. at 314–15 (quoting Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 13, 
§ 294, 36 Stat. 1167). 
 166. Id. at 318. 
 167. Id. at 313. 
 168. See id. at 315. 
 169. Id. at 316. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
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certain genre.”172  Although the Bougas analysis is proper in the venue 
context, it is improper in the subject matter jurisdiction context.173 
The Supreme Court refused to “render[] national banks singularly 
disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access to federal courts.”174  
To that end, the Court settled the existing circuit split by ruling that, in the 
diversity jurisdiction context, the term “located” does not refer to each and 
every place in which the bank has a branch office.175  The Court compared 
diversity for national banks with that of citizens and corporations: 
There is no reason to suppose Congress used [the words “in which they 
are respectively located”] to effect a radical departure from the norm.  An 
individual who resides in more than one State is regarded, for purposes of 
federal subject-matter (diversity) jurisdiction, as a citizen of but one State. 
. . .  Similarly, a corporation’s citizenship derives, for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, from its State of incorporation and principal place 
of business.  It is not deemed a citizen of every State in which it conducts 
business or is otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction.  Reading 
§ 1348 in this context, one would sensibly “locate’ a national bank for the 
very same purposes, i.e., qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the 
State designated in its articles of association as its main office.176 
Although the Court acknowledged that one could “sensibly” locate a 
national bank in its designated place of charter, it did not address the issue 
of whether a national bank is also a citizen of the state in which it has its 
principal place of business.  In footnote nine, the court observed, 
To achieve complete parity with state banks . . . [a national bank] would 
have to be deemed a citizen of both the State of its main office and the 
State of its principal place of business.  Congress has prescribed that a 
corporation “shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has 
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of 
business.”  The counterpart provision for national banking associations, 
§ 1348, however, does not refer to “principal place of business”; it simply 
deems such associations “citizens of the States in which they are 
respectively located.”177 
The Court went on to state the “[t]he absence of a ‘principal place of 
business’ reference in § 1348 may be of scant practical significance for, in 
almost every case, as in this one, the location of a national bank’s main 
offices and of its principal places of business coincide.”178 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  In fact, interpreting venue the way Bougas did effectively aligns the treatment of 
national banks with that of state banks and corporations, while interpreting diversity 
jurisdiction in the same way would cause a divergence between national banks and state 
banks or corporations. Id. at 316–17. 
 174. Id. at 319. 
 175. See id. at 318. 
 176. Id. at 318 (citation omitted). 
 177. Id. at 317 n.9 (citations omitted). 
 178. Id. 
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However, the Court appears to have been wrong about this assertion.  
Two of the world’s largest national banks, JP Morgan Chase and Wells 
Fargo, each have their main office and principal place of business in 
different states.179  Not surprisingly then, many courts recently have had to 
decide precisely this issue that the Supreme Court, intentionally or 
inadvertently, failed to decide. 
III.  POST-SCHMIDT:  WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A NATIONAL BANK’S MAIN 
OFFICE AND PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS ARE IN DIFFERENT STATES? 
Although Schmidt definitively ruled that a national bank is not a citizen 
of each and every state in which it has a branch, it did not end the national 
bank diversity jurisdiction problem.  After Schmidt two distinct views 
emerged with respect to diversity jurisdiction.  The first, championed by the 
Eighth Circuit and followed by many district courts, claims that a national 
bank is only a citizen of the place where its main office is located, as listed 
in its charter.  The second, upon which the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the 
Eighth Circuit dissent, and many district courts rely, holds that a national 
bank is a citizen of the state of its principal place of business as well. 
A.  A National Bank Is a Citizen Only of the State 
Where It Has Its Main Office 
Since Schmidt, one circuit court and several district courts have ruled that 
a national bank is only a citizen of the state where it has its main office as 
listed on its charter and is not a citizen of the state that is its principal place 
of business. 
1.  The Eighth Circuit Follows the One-State Approach 
The only circuit court to have weighed in on the debate since Schmidt 
was the Eighth Circuit in Wells Fargo Bank v. WMR e-PIN, LLC.180  The 
court was tasked with confirming an arbitration award in favor of Wells 
Fargo relating to alleged violations of software Licensing Agreements.181  
In a 2–1 opinion, written by Judge Wollman, the court held that a national 
bank is only located in the state listed as its main office on its organizational 
charter.182  In Wells Fargo, WMR and Synoran, the defendants, asserted 
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because 
diversity was lacking.183  Synoran was a citizen of California, and the 
defendants claimed that Wells Fargo was also a citizen of California 
because California is the state of its principal place of business.184  
 
 179. See Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 470 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 n.6 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Lund, supra note 22, at 104. 
 180. 653 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 181. Id. at 705. 
 182. Id. at 709. 
 183. Id. at 705. 
 184. Id. 
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However, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, holding 
that a national bank is only a citizen of the state of its main office and is not 
a citizen of the state that is its principal place of business.185 
Like the Supreme Court in Schmidt, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged 
that the term “located” is ambiguous.186  It then proceeded to analyze 
whether the term “located” includes a national bank’s principal place of 
business.  The court admitted that the principle of jurisdictional parity 
existed but questioned whether it remained intact after Congress enacted 
§ 1332(c)(1) in 1958, which added the principal place of business as an 
additional consideration in determining a corporation’s citizenship.187 
The court noted that the Supreme Court did not squarely address the 
issue in Schmidt, stating, “Because Wells Fargo’s main office is in a state 
other than that of its principal place of business, we must consider the 
outlier scenario identified in footnote nine of [Schmidt].”188  The court then 
reasoned that the Seventh Circuit, in Hicklin Engineering L.C. v. Bartell,189 
had changed Seventh Circuit jurisprudence by reading Schmidt as 
effectively overruling Faul.190  In Hicklin, the Seventh Circuit stated, “until 
[Schmidt] . . . there was a distinct possibility that national banks would be 
deemed citizens of every state . . . .  But [Schmidt] held that national banks 
are citizens only of the states in which their main offices are located.”191  
The dissent, however, argued that this statement could not have overturned 
precedent since the issue was not before the court and the statement was 
merely dicta.192 
The court then addressed its rationale for deciding that a national bank is 
a citizen only of the state in which it has its main office as listed on its 
charter.  The court reasoned that Faul and Horton were decided based on an 
“assumption that Congress intended to change the meaning of the former 
statute [§ 1348] when it enacted the latter [§ 1332(c)] in order to perpetuate 
jurisdictional parity.”193  The Eighth Circuit did not find this argument 
persuasive.194  Rather, the court believed that “[t]he most relevant time 
period for determining a statutory term’s meaning is the time when the 
 
 185. Id. at 709. 
 186. Id. at 706 (“We begin by noting that every court to consider the meaning of § 1348 
for purposes of jurisdiction has recognized that the term ‘located’ is ambiguous.”). 
 187. Id. at 707 (“Thus, the principle of jurisdictional parity emerged from the evolving 
statutory framework governing national banks.  The more vexing question is whether that 
principle remained intact after Congress adopted § 1332(c)(1) . . . .”). 
 188. Id. at 708. 
 189. 439 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 190. Wells Fargo, 653 F.3d at 708 (“The Seventh Circuit has gone further, reading 
[Schmidt] to reject the proposition embraced in its Firstar Bank decision that a national 
bank’s principal place of business is an independent basis for citizenship.”). 
 191. Hicklin Eng’g, 439 F.3d at 348. 
 192. Wells Fargo, 653 F.3d at 718 n.9. 
 193. Id. at 708. 
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statute was enacted.”195  Therefore, “[i]n 1948, when Congress last 
amended § 1348, it had not yet created principal-place-of-business 
citizenship.  At that time the term ‘located’ referred to the state in which the 
national bank had its main office, as designated by its articles of 
association.”196  At the time when § 1348 was last amended, the majority of 
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “located” could not possibly have referred 
to the principal place of business, since the concept was not yet created.  
Additionally, when Congress created principal-place-of-business 
citizenship in § 1332(c)(1), “it made no reference to jurisdictional parity, 
nor to national banks or § 1348.”197 
The Eighth Circuit majority rejected the alternative contention that 
“Congress intended to alter the meaning of § 1348 retroactively when it 
passed § 1332(c)(1) so as to retain jurisdictional parity.”198  In doing so, it 
refused to “assume . . . that jurisdictional parity is an immutable principle 
that endures long after the statutes from which it arose have been amended 
and all references to it have been excised.”199  The majority held that if 
Congress intended for there to be parity it would have said so; but “[i]t did 
not, and consequently the concept no longer applies.”200  According to the 
majority, whether or not that concept of parity should be revived is a matter 
for Congress to determine and not the courts.201  Thus, the majority in Wells 
Fargo found that a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its 
main office is located.202 
The majority also found support for its conclusion from a discussion 
between Justice Ginsburg and the attorney for the Office of the Comptroller 
of Currency (OCC), Sri Srinivasan, during oral argument in Schmidt.203  
When asked by Justice Ginsburg what happens if the principal place of 
business is different from the main office, Srinivasan replied, “[W]e don’t 
think that a national banking association is a citizen of a State in which its 
principal place of business is found.”204  He continued, “[t]hat’s because of 
the historical chronology.  The word located was first used in 1887 and the 
current version of section 1348 was enacted in 1948, which was 10 years 
before the concept of principal place of business had any jurisdictional 
 
 195. Id. (quoting Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase, 470 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  The court continued, “These circumstances strongly suggest that, with the 
passage of § 1332(c)(1), Congress reconfigured the jurisdictional landscape of state banks 
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 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 709. 
 201. Id. (“Whether it ought to be revived is a policy question for Congress, not the federal 
courts.  We will not import a jurisdictional concept into § 1348 that was unknown at the time 
of its adoption.”). 
 202. Id. at 709. 
 203. Id. at 709–10 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Wachovia Bank v. 
Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006) (No. 04-1186)). 
 204. Id. at 710 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Wachovia Bank v. 
Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006) (No. 04-1186)). 
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salience.”205  The Wells Fargo majority acknowledged that the OCC 
admitted that it was not an easy case, and that it was possible to conclude 
that § 1332(c)’s reference to principal place of business should also apply to 
national banks.206  However, based upon the above arguments, the Eighth 
Circuit held that a national bank is not a citizen of the state where it has its 
principal place of business, if that state is different from that of its main 
office.207 
2.  District Courts Since Schmidt That Have Followed the One-
State Approach 
The Southern District of New York in Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank also followed the one-state approach.208  Excelsior 
Funds sued Chase in New York state court, alleging various causes of 
action.209  In response, Chase removed the action to federal court claiming 
that the federal courts had jurisdiction based on diversity.210  Excelsior, a 
citizen of New York, made a motion to remand arguing that Chase was a 
citizen of New York and thus removal was improper.211  It argued that 
Chase’s principal place of business was in New York and thus should be 
deemed a citizen of New York.212  Chase, however, argued that it is only a 
citizen of Ohio, the state listed as its main office in its charter and, 
therefore, removal to federal court was proper.213 
The question before the court was whether a national bank for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes is considered a citizen of the state of its principal 
place of business in addition to the state listed on its charter.214  Judge 
Koeltl first analyzed footnote nine of Schmidt.215  Excelsior argued that the 
footnote adopts the principal of parity between national and state banks, 
while Chase argued that the footnote explicitly rejects such an idea.216  The 
judge concluded that although Chase’s reading was the fairest reading, the 
language was inconclusive and did not give a definitive answer.217 
 
 205. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 
U.S. 303 (2006) (No. 04-1186)). 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. 470 F. Supp. 2d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 209. Id. at 312–13. 
 210. Id. at 313. 
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 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 313–14. 
 214. Id. at 313. 
 215. Id. at 317. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. (“The language is inconclusive and it would have been unnecessary, based on the 
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Judge Koeltl then proceeded to the statutory analysis.218  Relying on 
Schmidt, he declared that there is no plain meaning of the word “located,” 
and other methods of statutory interpretation are insufficient to give a 
meaning to the term.219  So, the court looked to the legislative history of 
§ 1348.220  The court acknowledged that the original purpose of the statute 
was to put national banks on the same footing as state banks.221  However, 
“[t]he issue, then, is whether the term ‘located’ in § 1348, the current 
version of which was enacted in 1948, can be interpreted to include the 
concept of ‘principal place of business,’ which was first introduced in 
1958.”222  The court cited Supreme Court cases holding that the most 
relevant time period for determining a terms meaning is the time when the 
statute was enacted.223  The court concluded that there is “nothing in the 
text of § 1348 that suggests that the word ‘located’ changes its meaning in 
§ 1348 depending on the citizenship of state banks.”224  Rather, the statute 
must be interpreted based on the congressional intent at the time the statute 
was enacted, at which time principal-place-of-business jurisdiction had not 
yet existed.225  If Congress wanted jurisdictional parity forever, then it 
could have put language in § 1348 that “would have supported an argument 
for incorporating by reference subsequent changes to the citizenship of state 
banks or individual citizens.”226  But this is not the case, as all language 
mentioning parity was removed in 1911.227  Also, there is nothing to 
suggest that these statutes were intended to operate in tandem.228 
According to the court, there is nothing in the statutory text, nor in the 
legislative history, that supports the conclusion that “located” in § 1348 was 
meant to incorporate the concept of principal-place-of-business 
jurisdiction.229  Therefore, the court held that Chase is only a citizen of 
 
 218. Id. at 318. 
 219. Id. (“Turning first to the statute’s plain meaning, as the Supreme Court explained, 
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Ohio, which was the state listed as its main office on its charter, and not a 
citizen of New York.230  Excelsior could not have the case remanded to 
state court since there was complete diversity.231 
In DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank,232 Judge Fogel of the Northern District 
of California came to the same conclusion as Judge Koeltl.  In this case, 
DeLeon brought claims against Wells Fargo in state court claiming 
violations under California state law, including wrongful foreclosure.233  
Wells Fargo moved to remove the case to federal court claiming diversity 
jurisdiction.234  DeLeon, a California citizen, moved to remand the case to 
state court and claimed that Wells Fargo was a citizen of California since it 
has its principal place of business there.235  In the absence of Ninth Circuit 
authority on the issue, and relying on the rationale of Excelsior, the court 
declined to apply the dual-test approach.236 
B.  Courts Holding That a National Bank Is a Citizen Both of the State That 
Is Its Principal Place of Business and the State of Its Main Office 
To date, there have not been any circuit court decisions since Schmidt 
that have ruled that a bank is a citizen of the state that is its principal place 
of business in addition to the state of its main office.  However, Fifth and 
Seventh Circuit precedent, the dissent in the Eighth Circuit, and many 
district courts do not follow the one-state approach but rather follow the 
dual-citizenship test. 
1. The Wells Fargo Dissent 
The Eighth Circuit’s 2–1 decision in Wells Fargo was accompanied by a 
strong dissent by Judge Murphy.237  Judge Murphy argued that footnote 
nine in Schmidt leads to two different interpretations, and that the majority 
had in fact followed the one with less support.238 
Judge Murphy stressed that the two Supreme Court decisions that 
interpreted the precursors to § 1348, Cooper and Petri, placed national 
banks on the same footing as state banks.239  In addition, the first circuit 
court to interpret “located” was the Ninth Circuit in American Surety Co. v. 
 
maintains its principal place of business, when that state is different from the state of the 
national bank’s main office.”). 
 230. See id. at 323. 
 231. See id. 
 232. 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 233. Id. at 1121. 
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 235. See id. at 1121–22. 
 236. Id. at 1124 (“In the absence of controlling Ninth Circuit authority, this Court will 
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Bank of California,240 in which it held that national banks were citizens of 
the “states in which their principal places of business were maintained.”241  
Furthermore, according to the dissent, neither the Supreme Court nor 
Eighth Circuit precedent suggested in any way that the 1958 addition of 
principal-place-of-business jurisdiction for corporations (§ 1332(c)) 
changed “the longstanding and unanimous interpretations of § 1348 and its 
predecessors requiring jurisdictional parity between national and state 
banks.”242 
Judge Murphy then cited Faul (Seventh Circuit) and Horton (Fifth 
Circuit) as supporting the conclusion that national banks are citizens of the 
state in which their principal place of business is located and said that both 
decisions “were referenced positively” in Schmidt.243  According to Judge 
Murphy, the Schmidt court reaffirmed the reasoning in Faul and Horton in 
the course of its decision.244  Most significantly, the Schmidt court in fact 
employed the principle of jurisdictional parity as a basis for its conclusion, 
in direct contrast to the assertion by the majority that such a principle no 
longer applies.245 
Judge Murphy disagreed with the majority’s framing of the issue as 
whether the concept of jurisdictional parity “‘remained intact’ after the 
adoption of § 1332(c)(1).”246  Rather, according to him, the question that 
needed to be answered was whether Schmidt undermines the longstanding 
and unanimous precedent that national banks are citizens of their principal 
places of business.247  The answer for Judge Murphy was obviously not, as 
Schmidt should be read in light of the preexisting precedent and the policy 
of jurisdictional parity.248  As already mentioned, Schmidt applied the 
concept of jurisdictional parity in order to reverse the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision.249  If, as the majority in Wells Fargo suggested, the passage of 
§ 1332(c)(1) abrogated the concept of jurisdictional parity, then the 
Supreme Court in Schmidt would not have relied on this principle to reach 
its conclusion.250 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in footnote nine hinted that a national 
bank “would have to be deemed a citizen of both the State of its main office 
and the State of its principal place of business.”251  According to Judge 
Murphy, this statement, the Court’s reliance on the principal of 
jurisdictional parity, and the positive reference of the court to Faul and 
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Horton, show that the Supreme Court would consider a national bank a 
citizen of its principal place of business if it was faced with the issue.252 
Judge Murphy also focused on a different part of Srinivasan’s testimony, 
the attorney for the OCC, during the oral argument in Schmidt.253  In 
response to Justice Stevens, who asked if a national bank could have two 
parallel locations, Srinivasan remarked that a “[c]ourt in a case that 
specifically raised the issue . . . could construe 1332(c) . . . as also applying 
to national banking associations.”254  Justice Scalia then remarked that, if it 
was interpreted that way, it would eliminate any favoritism to national 
banks, to which Srinivasan agreed.255  According to Judge Murphy’s 
reading of the conversation, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and 
Stevens seemed to question the logic of the rule issued by the majority.256 
Judge Murphy found it relevant that all the Justices concurred in footnote 
nine and its acknowledgement that to achieve parity a national bank would 
have to be a citizen in both places.257  Furthermore, her position is 
supported by the position the OCC took in its Interpretive Letter in 2002 
and its amicus brief in Horton.258  Judge Murphy concluded that Congress 
could and should have made § 1348 clearer when it enacted § 1332(c)(1), 
but “it need not have done so given the preexisting understanding of the 
statute and its predecessors which placed national and state banks on equal 
jurisdictional footing.”259  Rather, if Congress intended to abrogate the 
principle of jurisdictional parity it would have affirmatively done so, since 
it would have been a “‘noteworthy departure’ from established 
jurisdictional principles.”260 
2.  The Continued Authority of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits After Schmidt 
The Seventh Circuit in Faul and the Fifth Circuit in Horton, as 
previously mentioned, held that a national bank, for diversity jurisdiction 
purposes, is a citizen of both the state listed as its main office on its charter 
and the state that is its principal place of business.261  Faul, in limiting the 
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locations where a national bank should be considered a citizen, compared 
national banks to corporations.262  It thus concluded that “‘located’ should 
be construed to maintain jurisdictional equality between national banks and 
state banks or other corporations.”263  In fact the court explicitly stated that 
a “national bank is ‘located’ in, and thus a citizen of, the state of its 
principal place of business and the state listed in its organization 
certificate.”264  Although Schmidt was decided after the Seventh Circuit 
decision, it in no way overruled any of its holdings or rationales.  In fact, 
the Schmidt Court acknowledged in footnote nine that to achieve complete 
parity, national banks would have to be citizens of the state that is their 
principal place of business as well as the state of their main offices.265 
Similarly, Horton held that § 1348 should be read as having the objective 
of ensuring jurisdictional parity between national banks and state banks.266  
Since state banks are citizens of two states, the state of incorporation and 
the state of its principal place of business, national banks must also be 
citizens of two states.267  The court did not want to restrict or expand a 
national bank’s access to federal court any more than that of a state bank, 
since that would break the desired parity.268  As the court noted, “[t]his 
results in a national bank’s having access to federal courts by diversity 
jurisdiction to the same extent as a similarly situated state bank or 
corporation.”269  The Supreme Court, in deciding Schmidt, relied heavily on 
Horton’s concept of jurisdictional parity.  In overturning the Fourth 
Circuit’s conclusion that a national bank was a citizen of all states where it 
has a branch, the Supreme Court refused to “render[] national banks 
singularly disfavored corporate bodies,” echoing Horton’s demand for 
jurisdictional parity.270 
Faul and Horton were decided before Schmidt but are still good law in 
their respective circuits.  Faul’s and Horton’s rationales and holdings were 
actually bolstered by Schmidt, especially Schmidt’s emphasis on 
jurisdictional parity. 
3.  District Courts Since Schmidt That Have Followed the Dual-
Test Approach 
Although only one circuit court has addressed the issue since Schmidt, 
many district courts have weighed in.  While many district courts have 
followed the one-state approach, many others have found that a national 
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bank is located in the state that is its principal place of business in addition 
to the state listed on the charter as its main office.271 
In Stewart v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp.,272 Judge Morrow of the Central 
District of California held that a federally chartered bank, for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, is considered a citizen of both the state listed on its 
charter and the state that is its principal place of business.273  Wells Fargo, 
successor to Wachovia Mortgage, had its principal place of business in San 
Francisco, California.274  Since the Plaintiff was also a California citizen, 
Judge Morrow remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.275 
The court reaffirmed that Schmidt did not decide the issue of whether a 
national bank is merely a citizen of the state listed on its charter or is 
additionally a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of 
business.276  According to the court in Stewart, the Schmidt Court did “not 
consider, or have occasion to consider, whether, given the imprecision of 
the word ‘located,’ a national bank might also be ‘located’ . . . in the state 
where it maintains its principal place of business.”277  Rather, the Supreme 
Court specifically noted that, in the case before it, the principal place of 
business was the state listed on the charter as its main office.278  Because 
the Supreme Court was silent on the issue, as was the Ninth Circuit, Judge 
Morrow was tasked with deciding the issue.279 
Judge Morrow reasoned that the Supreme Court noted that “located” was 
not a word of enduring rigidity, but rather one that gains its precise meaning 
from context.280  Moreover, according to the court in Stewart, the Supreme 
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Court emphasized that Congress desired for there to be jurisdictional parity 
between state chartered banks and federally chartered banks.281  A state 
chartered bank is a citizen of both the state of incorporation and the state of 
its principal place of business.282  Since Congress intended for there to be 
jurisdictional parity, a national bank must also be “located” in the state of 
its principal place of business.283  Judge Morrow also cited Faul and 
Horton, stating that they “rejected the contention that a national bank is 
located wherever it has branches . . . and both concluded a national bank is 
a citizen of the state of its principal place of business and the state listed in 
its organization certificate or articles of association.”284  Therefore, based 
on Horton, Faul, and other California district court decisions, Judge 
Murrow concluded that a national bank is both a citizen of the state listed 
on its charter and the state where it has its principal place of business. 
Similarly, other courts in the Central and Southern Districts of California 
have also followed the dual-test approach by relying on footnote nine of 
Schmidt in light of statutory history, various circuit court precedents, and 
the policy of parity between national and state banks.285 
Another district court to follow the dual-test approach is the Northern 
District of Oklahoma, in Dutton v. Wells Fargo Bank.286  In this case, 
Dutton brought an action in state court relating to allegations of breach of 
agreement and harassment by the defendant Wells Fargo.287  Wells Fargo 
then sought to remove the case to federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.288  Dutton, a citizen of California, claimed, inter alia, that the 
removal was improper since Wells Fargo was also a citizen of California, 
and thus complete diversity was lacking.289  According to Dutton, Wells 
Fargo was a citizen of California because California is the state of Wells 
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as state-charted banks, interpreting § 1348 so as to foreclose the possibility that a national 
bank is ‘located’ where it maintains its principal place of business would not further 
Congress’ purposes.”). 
 284. Id. at *4 (quoting Mount v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 08-6298 GAF(MANx), 2008 
WL 5046286, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 285. See, e.g., Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. EDCV 11-00928 DMG(DTBx), 
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 286. No. 11-CV-0352-CVE-PJC, 2011 WL 4526768 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 287. Id. at *1. 
 288. Id. at *2. 
 289. Id. at *4. 
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Fargo’s principal place of business.290  Wells Fargo, on the other hand, 
asserted that a national banking association is only a citizen of the one state 
listed in its articles of association as its main office.291 
Chief Judge Eagan noted that the case represented the outlier situation 
that Schmidt failed to address.292  Chief Judge Eagan asserted that there is 
no Tenth Circuit precedent on this issue.293  He found Stewart’s reasoning 
to be persuasive and thus held that Wells Fargo is both a citizen of South 
Dakota, the state of its main office, as well as California, the state of its 
principal place of business.294  The case was remanded to state court since 
both Dutton and Wells Fargo were citizens of California and, therefore, 
diversity jurisdiction was lacking.295 
IV.  THE DUAL-TEST APPROACH:  A NATIONAL BANK SHOULD BE DEEMED 
A CITIZEN OF BOTH THE STATE THAT IS DESIGNATED AS ITS MAIN OFFICE 
BY ITS CHARTER AND THE STATE THAT IS ITS PRINCIPAL 
PLACE OF BUSINESS 
Part IV of this Note explains why national banks should be on equal 
footing with state banks (i.e., why they should be considered citizens of 
both the states in which they have their principal places of business and the 
states in which they have their main office).  The term “located” is 
ambiguous, and thus the legislative history behind the implementation of 
§ 1348 must be used to determine how it should be interpreted.  The policy 
of jurisdictional parity demands that “located” be interpreted to refer to the 
state that is the principal place of business in addition to the state listed on 
the charter.  Part IV advocates that Congress, under its authority to grant 
access to federal court, should amend § 1348 to this effect. 
A.  Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt Left the Door Open for 
a Further Circuit Split 
The Supreme Court in Schmidt was forced to decide whether national 
banks should be considered citizens of each and every state in which they 
maintain a branch.296  In doing so, the court was tasked with interpreting 
the term “located” as mentioned in § 1348.297  Section 1348 provides that 
the national banks should be deemed citizens of the States in which they are 
“respectively located.”298  The Court concluded that the term “located” 
does not refer to each and every state in which a bank has a location.299  
 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at *6. 
 293. Id. at *7. 
 294. Id. 
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 296. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, the Court had the opportunity to decide whether “located” 
referred only to the state listed on the charter or to both the state of the 
banks principal place of business and the state listed on the charter.  
However, the Court refused to resolve the issue, and language from the 
opinion gives weight to both sides of the split.  Although the Court 
declared, “[O]ne would sensibly ‘locate’ a national bank . . . in the State 
designated in its articles of association,” it acknowledged that to achieve 
complete parity a national bank would have to be deemed a citizen of both 
the state of its main office as well as the state that is its principal place of 
business.300  In doing so, the Supreme Court left the door open for the 
current circuit split. 
B.  The Textual Canons of Statuary Interpretation Are 
Insufficient to Define “Located” 
This section analyzes several possible canons of statutory interpretation 
that could possibly be used in analyzing the meaning of “located” in 
§ 1348.  However, the various canons do not provide a clear answer and are 
thus insufficient. 
1.  The Term “Located” Is Ambiguous on Its Face and Thus Its Definition 
Cannot Be Derived From Its Plain Meaning 
When trying to interpret a statutory term, a court will often first try to 
determine whether the term is unambiguous.301  If the term is unambiguous 
then there is no need for further methods of interpretation.302  The Seventh 
and Fifth Circuits found that “located” does not have a plain meaning in the 
text and, therefore, moved on to other methods of statutory 
interpretation.303  The Fourth Circuit, however, held that “located,” 
according to various dictionaries it cited, is unambiguous and refers to any 
place where there is a physical presence.304  Without giving much 
reasoning, the Supreme Court definitively answered the question, declaring 
in Schmidt that the term “located” does not have a plain meaning, but rather 
is ambiguous.305 
Thus, since the term “located” has been declared to be ambiguous by the 
Supreme Court, its plain meaning cannot be relied upon in deciding 
whether “located” refers to the state that is a bank’s principal place of 
business in addition to the state that has its main office as listed on its 
charter, or simply to one state.  Therefore, further axioms of statutory 
interpretation must be considered in order to resolve the issue. 
 
 300. See supra note 175. 
 301. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 69–72, 103 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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2.  The Presence of “Established” and “Located” in § 1348 Is Most Likely a 
Coincidence of Statutory Drafting 
The first paragraph of § 1348 contains the word “established,” while the 
second paragraph contains the word “located.”306  Under the canons of 
statutory interpretation, generally when two different words are used in the 
same statute, they each should be given separate and distinct meanings.307  
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that “established” refers to the bank’s 
state listed on its charter and “located” refers to any state where the bank 
maintains a branch.308  The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, said that it is 
possible that “established” could refer only to the state listed on the charter, 
while “located” could mean the state listed on the charter and the state that 
is the principal place of business.309 
The Seventh Circuit’s argument, if accepted, would help support the 
dual-test approach.  However, the Supreme Court in Schmidt did not take 
that route.  Rather, the Court held that the canon was inapplicable to this 
case.310  The two terms did not have to be given distinct and separate 
meanings since they were likely a coincidence of statutory drafting.311  The 
two parts of the statute likely came from two different earlier provisions 
and were combined to form the statute as it now stands.312 
Since the Supreme Court has held that the words “established” and 
“located” are likely present only by coincidence, the canon that two words 
in the same provision should be given separate and distinct meaning is 
inapplicable.  Therefore, the canon cannot be used to help figure out the 
correct interpretation of the word “located,” as used in § 1348. 
3.  The Canon of In Pari Materia Cannot Be Applied to the Venue Statute 
and the Diversity Statute 
The canon of in pari materia applies when two statutes that relate to the 
same subject matter use the same statutory term.313  The canon says that the 
two statutes should be interpreted in light of, and consistently with, one 
another. 314 
The Supreme Court in Bougas determined that under 12 U.S.C. § 94, the 
previous venue statute, the term “located” referred to each and every state 
in which the bank had a branch.315  The Fourth Circuit, using the canon of 
in pari materia, determined that “located” in the diversity jurisdiction 
context should also be interpreted to mean each and every state in which the 
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bank had a branch.316  However, the Supreme Court in Schmidt rejected the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.317  Rather, the Court determined that the venue 
statute and the subject matter jurisdiction statute have different purposes 
and therefore cannot be read in pari materia.318  While venue is about the 
convenience of the litigants, subject matter jurisdiction is about the power 
of the federal court system to hear a case.319  Since § 1348 has a radically 
different function than the venue statute, the canon of in pari materia is 
inapplicable to the diversity statute.  Thus, the meaning of “located” cannot 
be understood by looking at how it has been defined in the venue statue.  
Since the textual canons of statutory interpretation are insufficient to 
provide assistance in interpreting “located” as it is written in § 1348, 
congressional intent and public policy must be considered. 
C.  Congressional Intent Supports the Dual-Test Approach 
Since 1882, Congress has always intended that national banks be treated 
the same as state banks for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.320  Indeed, 
because of this desire for parity, Congress stripped national banks from 
their automatic federal jurisdiction and instead subjected them to diversity 
jurisdiction in the same manner as state banks.321  Though, in 1887, the 
explicit parity language was changed, there was and still is an 
understanding that Congress intended for the jurisdictional parity to remain 
in place.  For example, the Cooper Court in 1887 and the Petri Court in 
1892 understood that Congress used the term “located” in a way as to give 
national banks the same access to federal court as state banks and other 
corporate institutions.322  Similarly, the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, when 
dealing with the modern day statue, § 1348, understood that the statute’s 
purpose was to create jurisdictional parity between national banks and state 
banks.323  Most importantly, the Supreme Court, in Schmidt, reached its 
decision by comparing national banks to state banks and corporations.324 
Those who support the alternative view, such as the Eighth Circuit, argue 
that, at the time when § 1348 was enacted in its current form, § 1332 did 
not contain a principal place of business reference, so there is no way 
“located” in § 1348 could have referred to principal place of business 
jurisdiction.325  They argue that Congress could not have possibly intended 
for the word “located” to automatically change when § 1332 was amended.  
According to this view, even if national bank and state bank parity was 
originally the goal, Congress “reconfigured the jurisdictional landscape” in 
 
 316. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
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1948 when it amended § 1332 to include principal-place-of-business 
jurisdiction but left § 1348 unchanged.326 
However, framing the issue as whether or not “located” was meant to 
automatically change ignores the historical salience of the word “located.”  
As the various cases before Schmidt (and Schmidt itself) show, the word 
“located” in the context of § 1348 does not have a specific meaning, but 
rather is a “chameleon word,” whose definition is contingent upon 
achieving jurisdictional parity.327  In the case of § 1348, “located” means, 
and has always meant, the various states where the bank would be 
considered a citizen if it were charted as a state corporation. 
Once the definition of “located” is understood in this way, it becomes 
clear that the question is not whether parity continues to be valid after 
§ 1332(c) was enacted, but rather whether any case or statute has 
eviscerated the precedent of interpreting the word “located” to refer to the 
states in which the bank would be considered a citizen if it were a state 
bank.  The answer to this must be no.328 
In fact, Schmidt reaffirmed the longstanding policy that the term 
“located” in § 1348 should always be interpreted in order to put national 
banks on the same footing as state banks.329  If by enacting § 1332(c) 
Congress evinced its intent to end the concept of jurisdictional parity 
between national and state banks, then the Supreme Court in Schmidt would 
not have relied on the exact same principal of parity to conclude that 
national banks are not citizens of every state in which they have a 
branch.330  Indeed, the Supreme Court stressed that the concept of 
jurisdictional parity remains a viable principle.331 
Congressional intent requires, and has always required, that jurisdictional 
parity between national banks and state banks be maintained.  Since a state 
bank is a citizen of both the state of its main office and its principal place of 
business, a national bank must also be a citizen of both of these places. 
D.  Equitable Considerations Require That National Banks Be Placed on 
the Same Footing As State Banks 
In 1882, Congress made it clear that national banks should not be given 
any additional access to federal court by their status as nationally chartered 
institutions, but rather national and state banks should be on the same 
footing.332  The Supreme Court similarly stressed the importance of not 
favoring one form of bank over another, when it refused to render national 
banks “singularly disfavored corporate bodies with regard to their access to 
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federal courts.”333  For the same reasons that national banks should not be 
disfavored corporate entities, they should also not be favored corporate 
entities. 
The one-state approach would in fact grant national banks greater access 
to federal court in the states where they have the most ties and the least 
justification for being able to select a federal forum.334  Under the one-state 
approach, when national banks are sued in the states that are their principal 
places of business, the banks have the option of removing the case to 
federal court.  Allowing the banks this option is an unnecessary burden on 
plaintiffs and has a serious effect on the plaintiffs’ chances of winning their 
cases.335  Since forum has been shown to affect the outcome of a case, 
allowing access to federal courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction 
should be carefully examined and limited only to those situations where 
Congress has determined that it is appropriate.336 
It is inequitable to allow national banks to invoke diversity jurisdiction in 
states where they have the most ties simply to statistically lower the 
plaintiffs’ chances of winning, to burden plaintiffs and to reduce the value 
of potential settlements.  Rather, the equitable outcome is that national 
banks be treated the same as state banks and be considered citizens of the 
state that is their principal place of business. 
E.  Congress Should Amend § 1348, As It Did § 1332(c), by Adding the 
Words “Principal Place of Business” To End the Confusion and Stop 
the Inequitable Results Reached by Some Courts 
As the majority of the Eighth Circuit correctly noted, access to federal 
courts is under the purview of Congress.337  Thus, Congress has the power 
to amend § 1348 and add the words “principal place of business.”  
The dual-test approach most closely comports with congressional intent, 
equity, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schmidt.  Congress can easily 
confirm this approach, without the need for the district courts, the circuit 
courts, or the Supreme Court to spend valuable resources on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Schmidt noted that the question whether national 
banks should be citizens of the state of their principal place of business in 
addition to the state listed on their charter as their main office was of scant 
practical significance.  The Court believed this because it assumed that in 
nearly every case the principal place of business would be the state listed on 
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the charter.  However, many of the nation’s largest banks, such as Wells 
Fargo and JP Morgan Chase, have their principal places of business in a 
different state than their main office.  Thus, numerous courts since Schmidt 
have been forced to decide the issue that the Supreme Court failed to 
decide. 
If the Supreme Court decides the issue, it should follow the dual-test 
approach.  Congressional intent and equity considerations demand that a 
national bank be considered a citizen of the state of its principal place of 
business in addition to the state where it has its main office, as listed on its 
charter.  In order to resolve the issue definitively and to confirm the dual-
test approach, Congress should step in and amend § 1348 to add the phrase 
“principal place of business.”  This will prevent the courts from wasting 
valuable time and resources. 
